The authors ran multiple experiments that uncover different aspects of active probing: Shadow (3 months) In the course of events, they also incidentally discovered and documented active probes for SoftEther VPN and App Engine–based domain fronting proxies. This research study set out to study active probing of obfs2, obfs3, and plain Tor TLS without pluggable transports ( "vanilla Tor"). If a server responds in a way characteristic of a proxy server, then the censor can block its IP address. Active probing is where the censor looks at what servers clients connect to, then makes its own connections to those same servers to see how they respond. This paper from 2015 takes a look at active probing done by the Great Firewall to discover obfuscated proxy servers. Roya Ensafi, David Fifield, Philipp Winter, Nick Feamster, Nicholas Weaver, Vern Paxson Here's a summary of the paper, in advance of the reading group discussion.Įxamining How the Great Firewall Discovers Hidden Circumvention Servers If it goes well, I would like to schedule a series of readings and discussions. I will try to make sure there is a video afterward for anyone who cannot attend. I'll post connection information closer to the date. We'll use some kind of video conference system. I don't yet know how the discussion will be set up. It followed "How the Great Firewall of China is Blocking Tor" (2012), which focused on Tor, and preceded "How China Detects and Blocks Shadowsocks" (2020), on Shadowsocks. This was an early, detailed look at active probing by the Great Firewall using a variety of protocols. "Examining How the Great Firewall Discovers Hidden Circumvention Servers", 2015
This is morning in the Americas, daytime in Europe and Africa, and evening in Asia and Oceania. By this, I hope to promote a better common understanding of censorship research. Let's read an old, significant paper, and then discuss it in a voice/video chat. The posts under the reading group label have so far simply been posted summaries of new research papers.
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